Do Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) Have Predefined Destinations for Emergency Counterattack?

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) play a crucial role in nuclear deterrence, a high-stakes game of poker that governs global security. This article explores whether these strategic weapons have predefined destinations for emergency counterattack, delving into the technological and strategic implications.

The Evolution of ICBM Targeting

Originally, when ICBMs were first deployed, they were pre-targeted with a limited number of destination coordinates. This targeted the most likely attack vectors such as Soviet missile silos for American ICBMs, or counter-value targets like cities for early submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Re-programming these missiles was a laborious and time-consuming process, requiring direct access to each missile and manual changes.

Modern Targeting Capabilities

With advancements in remote sensing, computing power, and technology, ICBM targeting has become more dynamic. Control rooms now have the capacity to program missiles with multiple destinations rapidly. For instance, if a nuclear attack is detected from Russia consisting of 100 warheads aimed at various US missile silos, the US can reliably track which silos are being targeted, and which Russian silos launched the missiles. In response, counterattacks can be launched from those silos, aiming at alternate Russian targets, thereby nullifying the initial attack.

The Mutual Detargeting Agreement

However, the 1994 Mutual Detargeting Agreement between the United States and Russia introduced a fascinating twist, especially for ICBMs. The coordinates in the computers of American and Russian ICBMs now point to open spaces in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This agreement signifies a slower, more deliberate approach to nuclear targets, reducing the immediate risk of a first-strike counterattack.

Current Counterattack Strategies

Despite advanced targeting systems, the command and control systems underlying these strategies pose significant vulnerabilities. Key command and control locations would likely be the primary targets in a nuclear exchange, ensuring that targeted messages may only last a matter of minutes. Moreover, the trend to deploy Maneuverable Reentry Vehicles (MARVs) further complicates matters. These sophisticated warheads can reorient mid-flight, potentially confusing the opponent and leading to counterattacks against a broader range of important Russian targets, even with a small attack.

Conclusion

The current state of ICBM targeting raises complex questions about the effectiveness of emergency counterattacks in a nuclear exchange. While advanced targeting systems offer significant advantages, they also expose critical weaknesses. The uncertainty and risks associated with nuclear deterrence highlight the need for continued dialogue and disarmament efforts.

There is a significant debate over the future of these systems and the prospects for dismantling them. Ultimately, the complex and aggressive nature of human interactions, driven by power and wealth, poses a severe threat to humanity. Addressing these challenges requires thoughtful and sustained international cooperation.